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THE HEALTH CARE REFORM ACT OF
2010 AND MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
LIABILITY: WORLDS IN COLLISION OR
SHIPS PASSING IN THE NIGHT?
Thomas L. Hafemeister*
Joshua Hinckley Porter**
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 tackles many
health care-related issues, but medical malpractice liability reform is not
one of them. Despite being a perennial target of health care reform-with
accompanying assertions that a medical malpractice liability crisis is cor-
rupting the delivery of health care in the United States-only three short
sections that made little substantive change to existing law were devoted to
it in a bill that eventually totaled over 900 pages in length. This Article
describes what the bill did, what it failed to do, and its likely and perhaps
unanticipated consequences for the ongoing medical malpractice liability
reform debate.
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HE Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA),' en-
acted on March 23, 2010, to cheers and euphoria on one side of the
political spectrum and doom, gloom, and predictions of apocalypse
on the other, tackles many health care-related issues, but medical mal-
practice liability reform is not one of them.2 Despite being a perennial
target of health care reform-with accompanying assertions that a medi-
cal malpractice liability crisis is corrupting the delivery of health care in
the United States3-only three short sections were devoted to it in a bill
that eventually totaled over 900 pages in length, two of which made no
substantive change to existing law while the third made only a minor
change. 4
This outcome was probably not surprising given the bitterly partisan
fight that surrounded the PPACA's tortuous journey through Congress, 5
1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections at 42 U.S.C.).
2. See generally id.
3. See Timothy D. Lytton, Robert L. Rabin & Peter H. Schuck, Tort as a Litigation
Lottery: A Misconceived Metaphor, 52 B.C. L. REv. 267, 268-69 (2011); see also Edward P.
Richards & Thomas R. McLean, Administrative Compensation for Medical Malpractice In-
juries: Reconciling the Brave New World of Patient Safety and the Torts System, 49 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 73, 83 (2004) ("The aggregate effect of the[ ] false positive and false negative
signals from the medical malpractice system is to convince physicians that medical mal-
practice claims are random events."); Mark A. Rothstein, Health Care Reform and Medical
Malpractice Claims, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHics 871, 871 (2010) ("seemingly interminable de-
bates about health care reform in the last few years"); David M. Studdert et al., Claims,
Errors, and Compensation Payments in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 354 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 2024, 2025 (2006).
It has also been noted that claims of a medical malpractice liability crisis have long been
raised periodically and predate the American Civil War. Allen D. Spiegel & Florence
Kavaler, America's First Medical Malpractice Crisis, 1835-1865, 22 J. COMMUNITY HEALTH
283, 283-85 (1997) ("Between 1800 and 1835, medical malpractice in the United States was
virtually unknown .... Within the thirty year period from 1835-1865, medical malpractice
lawsuits began to inundate the courts.... Dr. Frank H. Hamilton. . . 'a respected Buffalo
(NY) surgeon... ,' estimated that nine out of every ten physicians in western New York
had been charged with malpractice by the mid-nineteenth century .... In 1860, a text on
medical jurisprudence asserted: 'There can hardly be found a place in the country, where
the oldest physicians in it have not, at some periods in their lives, been actually sued or
annoyingly threatened.' . . . Even though America's first medical malpractice crisis began
to evolve more than 160 years ago, many of the factors that gave rise to it have remained
constant over the years."). It is possible, however, that this cyclic pattern has been altered
by the recent national focus on health care reform in general. Allen Kachalia & Michelle
M. Mello, New Directions in Medical Liability Reform, 364 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1564, 1564
(2011) ("As policymakers' attention has shifted from winning passage of the health reform
bill to determining how to implement and pay for it, medical liability reform has remained
a focus because of its perceived potential to help 'bend the health care cost curve."').
4. See PPACA §§ 6801, 10607, 10608. Arguably section 10608 did institute one sub-
stantive change, but it is relatively minor because it merely extends federal malpractice
protections to the nonmedical personnel of free clinics. Randall R. Bovbjerg, Will the Pa-
tient Protection and Affordable Care Act Address the Problems Associated with Medical
Malpractice?, TIMELY ANALYSIS OF IMMEDIATE HEALTH POL'Y ISSUES, Aug. 2010, at 1,
available at http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/412193-ppaca-medical-malpractice.pdf.
5. David M. Herszenhorn & Robert Pear, Health Vote Is Done, but Partisan Debate
Rages On, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2010, at A19.
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the sharply contested debate over the need for medical malpractice liabil-
ity reform in general,6 and that positions on malpractice liability reform
frequently break down along party lines, typically with Republicans sup-
porting and Democrats opposing such reforms.7 Indeed, for a number of
years now, the Republican Party leadership has routinely introduced
medical malpractice reform bills in Congress, proposals that have been
vigorously contested and thus far defeated by members of the Demo-
cratic Party.8
In the log-rolling that led up to the passage of the PPACA, there was
some speculation that this partisan split might be bridged. 9 For example,
when President Barack Obama gave an invited presentation to the mem-
bers of the American Medical Association, some construed his remarks
as indicating a willingness to address medical malpractice reform in the
PPACA.10 A similar gloss was applied by some to a speech he made to
Congress a few months later urging passage of this bill.11 Nonetheless,
6. See David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, Medical Malpractice Litigation and Tort
Reform: It's the Incentives, Stupid, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1085, 1086-87 (2006); Rothstein,
supra note 3, at 871.
7. See Hyman & Silver, supra note 6, at 1086; Rothstein, supra note 3, at 871.
8. See Tanya Albert, Medical Liability Crisis: Tort Reform Bill Goes to Congress, AM.
MED. NEWS (Feb. 24, 2003), http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2003/02/24/gvllO224.htm;
see also infra note 33.
9. See Dan Gerstein, Op-Ed., Obama's Masterful Health Care Maneuver: With His
Speech Monday, The President Moves to Break the Trial Lawyers' Choke Hold on the Dem-
ocratic Party, FORBES.COM (June 17, 2009), http://ww.forbes.com/2009/06/16/obama-health-
care-trial-lawyer-opinions-columnists-malpractice.html.
10. See President Obama's Speech to American Medical Association, USA TODAY,
June 15, 2009, at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2009-06-15-obama-speech-text
_N.htm. In the speech, President Obama said:
Now, I recognize that it will be hard to make some of these changes if doc-
tors feel like they are constantly looking over their shoulder for fear of law-
suits. Some doctors may feel the need to order more tests and treatments to
avoid being legally vulnerable. That's a real issue. And while I'm not advo-
cating caps on malpractice awards which I believe can be unfair to people
who've been wrongfully harmed, I do think we need to explore a range of
ideas about how to put patient safety first, let doctors focus on practicing
medicine, and encourage broader use of evidence-based guidelines. That's
how we can scale back the excessive defensive medicine reinforcing our cur-
rent system of more treatment rather than better care.
Id.; see also Gerstein, supra note 9.
11. See Jonathan Weisman & Janet Adamy, President Makes His Pitch: Health Plan
Cut to $900 Billion with Tax on Premium Coverage; GOP Unmoved, WALL STREET J.,
Sept. 10, 2009, at Al ("President Barack Obama gave an emotional, sometimes conten-
tious address to Congress on Wednesday, combining tough talk to opponents with olive
branches on policy in a bid to break the impasse on revamping the health-care system....
The president pledged to tackle medical-malpractice lawsuits in an overture to Republi-
cans."). President Obama's 2011 State of the Union address also included remarks that
were viewed by some as supporting medical malpractice reform. David G. Savage,
Obama's Talk of Medical Malpractice Reform Surprises Both Sides, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 28,
2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/28/nation/la-na-medical-mapractice-201101 2 9
("The president's words breathed new life into the often discussed but never enacted Re-
publican [medical malpractice reform] initiative."); Elizabeth Stawicki, Obama Opens
Door to Medical Malpractice Reform, MINN. PUB. RADIO NEWS, Jan. 26, 2011, http://
minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2011/01/26/tort-reform/. But see Ticardo Alonso-
Zaldivar, Obama Budget, House Panel Address Medical Malpractice Reforms, INS. J.,
Feb. 18, 2011, http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2011/02/18/186 902 .htm#
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the PPACA was ultimately passed along rigid party lines with no substan-
tive attention given to the topic of medical malpractice liability reform. 12
Currently, there are a series of legal challenges to the PPACA winding
their way through the courts, driven primarily by elected Republican offi-
cials from various states, claiming, among other things, that the enact-
ment of the PPACA by the Democratic majority exceeded the
constitutional authority of the federal government. 13 Ironically, the posi-
tions of the two political parties on this constitutional authority could be
diametrically reversed should the Republicans ultimately regain power in
both houses and succeed in passing a federal medical malpractice reform
package, with Democratic officials then asserting that such an enactment
exceeds the constitutional power of Congress. 14
It is not the purpose of this Article, however, to offer opinions as to
which political party holds the high ground in these debates. Rather, its
goal is to evaluate the impact of the PPACA on medical malpractice lia-
bility reform, modest though it may be, and to note that the little atten-
tion it did give to the topic may ultimately further impede reconciliation
between what already appear to be two relatively irreconcilable positions.
II. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LIABILITY AND ITS COSTS
First, however, a few words about medical malpractice liability itself. It
is routinely reported that "one of every 100 hospital patients suffers negli-
gent treatment, and that as many as 98,000 die each year as a result,' 15
("Obama's proposal also got a cool reception from congressional Republicans, who feel he
has a record of promising more on malpractice than he delivers.").
12. Herszenhorn & Pear, supra note 5, at A19; Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Robert Pear,
Obama Signs Health Care Overhaul Bill, with a Flourish, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2010, at
A19.
13. Thus far, the two federal appellate courts that have ruled on the matter have split
on whether the PPACA meets constitutional requirements. Compare Thomas More Law
Ctr. v. Obama, No. 10-2388, 2011 WL 2556039, *16 (6th Cir. June 29, 2011) (upholding the
PPACA) with Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep't Health & Human Servs., Nos. 11-
11021, 11-11067, 2011 WL 3519178, *83 (11th Cir. Aug. 12, 2011) (striking down the re-
quirement that individuals purchase and maintain health insurance). See also T.R.
Goldman, Health Policy Brief Legal Challenges to Health Reform, HEALTH AFFAIRS (July
8, 2011), http://www.rwjf.org/files/research/72585hahr201107.pdf; Timothy Jost, Appellate
Court: Individual Mandate Falls But Rest of Affordable Care Act Survives, HEALTH AF-
FAIRS BLOG (Aug. 15, 2011), http://healthaffairs.orgblog/2011/08/15/appellate-court-
individual-mandate-falls-but-rest-of-affordable-care-act-survives/; William Sage, The Legal
Battle over Health Reform: Analyzing the l1th Circuit Opinions, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG
(Aug. 16, 2011), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2011/08/16/the-legal-battle-over-health-
reform-analyzing-the-llth-circuit-opinions/; Bara Vaida & Karl Eisenhower, Scoreboard:
Tracking Health Law Court Challenges, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Aug. 24, 2011), http://
www.kaiserhealthnews.org/ Stories /2011/March /02/health-reform-law-court-case-status.
aspx? ("KHN is tracking the status of 26 federal lawsuits seeking to overturn the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act.").
14. See generally Betsy J. Grey, The New Federalism Jurisprudence and National Tort
Reform, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 475 (2002); Nim Razook, A National Medical Malprac-
tice Reform Act (and Why the Supreme Court May Prefer to Avoid It), 28 SETON HALL
LEGIS. J. 99 (2003).
15. Kevin Sack, Doctors Say 'I'm Sorry' Before 'See You in Court', N.Y. TIMES, May
18, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/18/us/18apology.html; see also Carolyn M.
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with the economic burden of preventable medical injuries set at $17-$29
billion per year. 16 At the same time, the direct cost that health care prov-
iders incur from medical malpractice liability is asserted to be in the tens
of billions of dollars each year, with two notable estimates being $10 bil-
lion (combining indemnity payments and administrative expenses) 17 and
$35 billion (combining malpractice insurance premiums with settlements,
awards, and administrative costs not covered by insurance, an amount
calculated to be about 2% of total health care expenditures). 18 Whether
or not these figures are accurate, they and other estimates have garnered
a great deal of attention. 19 In the twelve years since the Institute of
Medicine released its sobering To Err Is Human report, which detailed
America's grim track record on patient safety and preventable iatrogenic
injuries, significant efforts have been made to improve the quality of the
care patients receive and to address the causes of both medical malprac-
tice and malpractice suits.20 Indeed, despite continuing population
Clancy, Patient Safety and Medical Liability Reform: Putting the Patient First, PATIENT
SAFETY & QUALITY HEALTHCARE, Sept.-Oct. 2010, at 6 ("More than 15 percent of pa-
tients receiving hospital care are harmed by the process of care they receive.") (citing
AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, NATIONAL HEALTHCARE QUALITY
REPORT (2009)).
16. Michelle M. Mello, Amitabh Chandra, Atul A. Gawande & David M. Studdert,
National Costs of the Medical Liability System, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1569, 1570 (2010); see also
Clancy, supra note 15 ("Only 22 cents of every dollar spent settling a medical liability claim
is spent on compensating patients .... Patients who are seriously harmed from the process
of care often wait for years before receiving compensation.").
17. Id. The authors further estimate that when the effects of using defensive medicine
to avoid liability are taken into account, this amount rose to $55.6 billion in 2008 dollars.
Id.
18. Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to Senator Orrin
G. Hatch (Oct. 9, 2009), http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/106xx/doclO641/1O-09-Tort-Reform.
pdf. Health care providers may also incur significant indirect and psychological costs. See
infra note 97 and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen, Contracting Over Liability: Medical Malpractice and the
Cost of Choice, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 957 (2010); Theodore R. LeBlang, Medical Malpractice
Crisis-Is There a Solution?, 27 J. LEGAL MED. 1 (2006).
20. NANCY BERLINGER, AFTER HARM: MEDICAL ERROR AND THE ETHICS OF FOR-
GIVENESS 11 (2005); see also MICHAEL D. GREENBERG, AMELIA M. HAVILAND, J. SCoTT
ASHWOOD & REGAN MAIN, Is BETTER PATIENT SAFETY ASSOCIATED WITH LESS MAL-
PRACTICE AcTIvrT: EVIDENCE FROM CALIFORNIA 1-19 (2010) (showing a significant cor-
relation between the frequency of adverse events and malpractice claims); Barry R.
Furrow, Regulating Patient Safety: The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U.
PA. L. REV. 1727, 1727 (2011); Ronen Avraham, Op-Ed, A Market Solution for Malprac-
tice, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2011, at A31 ("It's been a year since health care reform was
signed into law, and since then both Republicans and Democrats have been trying to ad-
dress one item it left out: medical malpractice reform, In last month's budget proposal, the
Obama administration offered a solution: a plan to encourage evidence-based medicine by
limiting the malpractice liability of doctors who follow clinical practice guidelines-in ef-
fect, granting them immunity .... [But] Mr. Obama's proposal to limit the liability of
doctors who follow these flawed guidelines . . . is clearly not the way to better care.");
News Release, U.S. Dep't Health & Human Servs., Partnership for Patients to Improve
Care and Lower Costs for Americans (Apr. 12, 2011), http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/
2011pres/04/20110412a.html (proclaiming a "[n]ew partnership between Administration,
the private sector, hospitals and doctors to make care safer, potentially save up to $50
billion" with "leaders from across the nation pledg[ing] their commitment to this new initi-
ative" and "HHS announc[ing] it would invest up to $1 billion in federal funding, made
available under the Affordable Care Act"); U.S. Dep't Health & Human Servs., Report to
2011]
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growth and the increasing number of medical procedures performed, the
absolute number of medical malpractice claims filed has dropped sub-
stantially since the report was released.2 ' Numerous studies have investi-
gated the needs of injured patients and the reasons they file lawsuits
against their health care providers, with efforts made at all levels of the
health care system, from private institutions to state laws, to address the
concerns of both patients and providers, often with an emphasis on avoid-
ing recourse to the courts.22
Nevertheless, the cost of physicians' malpractice insurance premiums
rose significantly in the first half of the last decade despite purported im-
provements in the quality of care they delivered and either static or de-
creased levels of awards in malpractice suits. 23 Whatever the reason for
Congress: National Strategy for Quality Improvement in Health Care (Mar. 2011), http://
www.healthcare.gov/center/reports/qualityO3212011a.html#es ("[T]he implementation of
this Strategy will lead to a measurable improvement in outcomes of care, and in the overall
health of the American people.").
21. Rothstein, supra note 3, at 873 ("All of the available data clearly suggest the num-
ber of cases filed has dropped significantly in the last decade. One source is data from
certain states that maintain the number of state medical malpractice filings. For example,
in Pennsylvania, case filings declined from 2,632 in 2000 to 1,533 in 2009. Another source
is the National Practitioner Data Bank, which compiles the number of medical malpractice
payments made each year. From 2000 to 2009, the number of payments made on behalf of
physicians declined from 15,447 to 10,772 .... Indeed, a leading insurance industry publi-
cation stated: 'Overall, the most significant trend in [medical professional liability insur-
ance] results over the five years through 2008 is the ongoing downward slope in the
frequency of claims."'); see also Bobby Kerlik, Malpractice Lawsuits in Pennsylvania Con-
tinue to Decline, PITTSBURGH TRIBUNE-REV., May 22, 2011, http://www.pittsburghlive.com/
x/pittsburghtrib/email/s_738354.html?_s_icmp=et ("The number of medical malpractice
cases filed against Pennsylvania doctors and hospitals dropped in 2010, the sixth consecu-
tive annual decline."). Further, a recent empirical study purports to show that most medi-
cal malpractice claims are abandoned by the plaintiffs that brought them. Dwight Golann,
Dropped Medical Malpractice Claims: Their Surprising Frequency, Apparent Causes, and
Potential Remedies, 30 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1343, 1343 (2011).
22. Paul J. Barringer, David M. Studdert, Allen B. Kachalia & Michelle M. Mello,
Administrative Compensation of Medical Injuries: A Hardy Perennial Blooms Again, 33 J.
HEALTH POL'Y & L. 725, 725 (2008); Richards & McLean, supra note 3, at 74; Albert L.
Strunk & John T. Queenan, Beyond Negligence: Administrative Compensation for Adverse
Medical Outcomes, 115 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 896, 896 (2010); Amy Widman, Lia-
bility and the Health Care Bill: An "Alternative" Perspective, 1 CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT 57, 59
(2010); Michelle M. Mello & Allen Kachalia, Evaluation of Options for Medical Malprac-
tice System Reform: A Report to the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPA C)
(Apr. 2010), htttp://www.medpac.gov/documents/AprlOMedicalMalpracticeCONTRAC-
TOR.pdf; Gale Scott, Med Mal Cases Get Expert Hearings: Bronx System Uses Judges, Not
Juries, Streamlines Costly Process, CRAIN'S N.Y. BUSINESS, Aug. 22, 2010, http://www.
crainsnewyork.com/article/20100822/SUB/308229981.
For an exploration of the reasons that patients sue their health care providers, see Roth-
stein, supra note 3, at 872. State laws permitting physicians to issue apologies to patients
who suffer negative outcomes, without fear that those statements will be used against them
in court as an admission of fault, are an example of an attempt to provide patients with
what they often desire (candidness and concern from their health care providers), while
obviating the need for them to sue their health care provider to get it. Sack, supra note 15;
American Medical Ass'n, Advocacy Resource Center, I'm Sorry Laws: Summary of State
Laws (July 2007), http://www.physicianspractice.comlalllp2files/images/publication/charts/
11_2007_TheLawChartl.pdf.
23. J. ROBERT HUNTER, GILLIAN CASSELL-STIGA & JOANNE DOROSHow, AMERI-
CANS FOR INSURANCE REFORM, TRUE RISK: MEDICAL LIABILITY, MALPRACTICE INSUR-
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these rate increases, they generated, as they have previously,24 the per-
ception among health care providers of a malpractice liability crisis fueled
by the litigiousness of patients (driven by greedy plaintiffs' lawyers) and
outsized awards made by juries.25 As has also happened in the past, 26 this
perceived crisis triggered renewed calls for tort reform to limit medical
malpractice suits, which in turn, it was believed, would ultimately reduce
the malpractice premiums of health care providers. 27
But such calls for reform are not the only consequences of a perceived
medical malpractice liability crisis.28 It is frequently asserted that physi-
cians, out of fear of potential liability, engage in what has come to be
known as "defensive medicine"-orders for tests and treatment that are
of dubious medical value yet are thought to protect physicians from fu-
ture lawsuits by defusing arguments that they acted negligently in failing
to order a given procedure. 29 Proponents of malpractice liability reform
often contend that significant savings in health care expenditures could
ANCE AND HEALTH CARE 14 (2009), available at http://www.centerjd.org/air/TrueRiskF.pdf
(graph).
24. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAw 346 (2d ed. 2000) ("The most visible
manifestation of the malpractice crisis in the 1970s and again in the 1980s was the size of
increase in premiums for malpractice insurance purchased by health care professionals and
institutions.").
25. See, e.g., Richard G. Roberts, Understanding the Physician Liability Insurance Cri-
sis, FAM. PRAC. MGMT., Oct. 2002, at 47 (2002) ("The most important factor in rising medi-
cal liability premiums appears to be the size of the awards.").
26. FURROW ET AL., supra note 24, at 349-50 ("The response to the perceived 'crisis'
in malpractice litigation and insurance availability ... has been twofold. First, the availa-
bility of insurance has been enhanced by changes in the structure of the insurance industry.
Second, provider lobbies and insurers have lobbied with substantial success at the state
level for legislation to impede the ability of plaintiffs to bring tort suits; to restrict the size
of awards; and to more clearly delineate the standard of care required. It was hoped...
that state legislation ... would thereby obviate the crisis in availability and affordability in
malpractice insurance.").
27. See Opinion, The Malpractice Insurance Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2003, http://
www.nytimes.com /2003/01 / 17/ opinion/the-malpractice-insurance-crisis.html?scp=l&sq=
The%20Malpractice%20lnsurance%20Crisis&st=cse. But see Tom Baker, Medical Mal-
practice and the Insurance Underwriting Cycle, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 393, 394-95 (2005).
These calls for reform ultimately led to the enactment of numerous associated state mea-
sures, which in turn resulted in a series of lawsuits challenging these measures. See, e.g.,
Estate of McCall v. United States, 642 F.3d 944, 953 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding Florida's
statutory cap on non-economic damages in medical malpractice cases does not violate
equal protection or the Takings Clause of the federal or state constitution); Lebron v. Got-
tlieb Mem'l Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895, 914 (Ill. 2010) (striking down a 2005 Illinois medical
malpractice law that limited the non-economic damages available to victims of medical
malpractice); MacDonald v. City Hosp., Inc., No. 35543, 2011 WL 2517201 (W. Va. June 22,
2011) (ruling West Virginia law that limits non-economic damage awards in medical mal-
practice cases does not violate the state constitution); see also Thomas Kaplan, Lessons for
Albany on Malpractice Limits, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2011, at A22 ("As New York
lawmakers strive to complete the state budget . . . , one of the most contentious battles
involves whether to include a cap on medical malpractice payments .... But other states
that have similar caps in place offer cautionary evidence about the big savings for health
care providers that such limits are believed to produce.").
28. See Mello et al., supra note 16, at 1569 (recognizing the connection between medi-
cal malpractice liability and defensive medicine).
29. A common definition of defensive medicine is "when doctors order tests, proce-
dures, or visits, or avoid certain high-risk patients or procedures, primarily (but not solely)
because of concern about malpractice liability." Mello et al., supra note 16, at 1572 (citing
2011]
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be obtained if physicians did not feel obligated to order these unneces-
sary procedures to protect themselves from liability.30 While estimates
vary widely, researchers at Harvard University recently placed the cost of
defensive medicine at $45.6 billion per year (based on the year 2008), or
roughly 2% of the nation's health care spending.3 1
III. THE FEDERAL RESPONSE
Yet despite the vigorous continuing debate over medical malpractice
liability, the PPACA did not take a position on the issue. 32 Instead, sec-
tion 6801 simply expresses the "sense of the Senate" (and thus not the
House at that time)33 that "health care reform presents an opportunity to
address issues related to medical malpractice and medical liability insur-
ance" and that:
[s]tates should be encouraged to develop and test alternatives to the
existing civil litigation system as a way of improving patient safety,
reducing medical errors, encouraging the efficient resolution of dis-
putes, increasing the availability of prompt and fair resolution of dis-
putes, and improving access to liability insurance, while preserving
an individual's right to seek redress in court[,]
while recommending that "Congress should consider establishing a State
demonstration program to evaluate alternatives to the existing civil litiga-
tion system with respect to the resolution of medical malpractice
claims."'34 Section 10607 of the PPACA goes on to establish such a pro-
gram, providing federal grants to support state demonstration projects
U.S. CONG., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, DEFENSIVE MEDICINE AND MEDICAL MAL-
PRACTICE, OTA-H-602 (1994), available at http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/policy/9405.pdf).
30. See President Obama's Speech to American Medical Association, supra note 10.
31. Mello et al., supra note 16, at 1574. At the same time, these conclusions and the
impact of medical malpractice liability reform have been sharply contested. See Aaron
Carroll, Meme-Busting: Tort Reform = Cost Control, WASH. POST, June 2, 2011, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/meme-busting-tort-reform-cost-control/
2011/06/02/AGpbDHH-blog.html?referrer=emaillink ("it's not the solution to our high
health-care-spending").
32. See generally PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6801, 124 Stat. 119-1025 (2010) (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
33. The Democratic Party held a majority in the House of Representatives when the
PPACA was enacted. In the following Congressional election of 2010, the Republican
Party gained a majority and promptly introduced a bill to reform medical malpractice lia-
bility nationally, which included provisions to place a three-year statute of limitations on
malpractice lawsuits, a cap on non-economic damages, and a limit on punitive damages.
Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act of 2011, H.R. 5,
112th Cong. (2011). The Democrat-controlled Senate, however, has signaled its unwilling-
ness to pass this bill (assuming it can survive some Republican opposition to it in the
House), notwithstanding that its previously stated "sense of the Senate" could be con-
strued to suggest amenability to such legislation. See Alexander Bolton, Senate Democrats
Skeptical on Malpractice Reform, THE HILL: HEALTHWATCH, Jan. 26, 2011, http://thehill.
com/blogs/healthwatch/other/140255-senate-democrats-greet-call-for-medical-malpractice-
reform-with-skepticism; Brett Coughlin, House Judiciary Approves Tort Reform, POLIT-
ICO, Feb. 16, 2011, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0211/49703.html; Savage, supra
note 11.
34. PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6801, 124 Stat. 119-1025 (2010) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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intended to test the effectiveness of alternatives to the current medical
tort litigation system.35 Whether one considers these modest provisions
to be a step in the right direction toward making rational and empirically
driven changes to the existing litigation system or a wasted opportunity to
enact needed national reform, they are certainly nothing like the sweep-
ing overhaul of other parts of the nation's health care system that can be
found elsewhere in the bill.
36
To say that the PPACA adopted a minimalist approach when it came to
the topic of malpractice liability reform is not to suggest that the current
administration is wholly uninterested in addressing the matter (although
skeptics may disagree).3 7 In his September 2009 address to Congress pre-
viously noted,38 as the debate over health care reform was taking center
stage in Congress, President Obama signaled at least some willingness to
address medical malpractice reform when he stated:
I don't believe malpractice reform is a silver bullet, but I've talked to
enough doctors to know that defensive medicine may be contributing
to unnecessary costs. So I'm proposing that we move forward on a
range of ideas about how to put patient safety first and let doctors
focus on practicing medicine. . . . I'm directing my Secretary of
Health and Human Services to move forward on [a demonstration
projects] initiative today. 39
The directive that the President gave to the Secretary of the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services (DHHS) resulted in the establish-
ment of the Patient Safety and Medical Liability Initiative, a program
administered by the DHHS and the Agency for Healthcare Research and
Quality to provide grants for the planning and demonstration of a variety
of proposed means for improving patient safety and reducing medical lia-
bility costs. 40 While the criteria and funding for these grants were desig-
35. Id. § 10607 ("Each State desiring a grant... shall develop an alternative to current
tort litigation that allows ... for the development, implementation, and evaluation of alter-
natives to current tort litigation for resolving disputes over injuries allegedly caused by
health care providers or health care organizations," and that "allows for the resolution of
disputes over injuries allegedly caused by health care providers or health care organiza-
tions; and ... promotes a reduction of health care errors by encouraging the collection and
analysis of patient safety data related to disputes resolved ... by organizations that engage
in efforts to improve patient safety and the quality of health care.").
36. See, e.g., id. § 1501 (requiring individuals to maintain minimum essential insurance
coverage).
37. See Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Overhauling Health Care: Address to a
Joint Session of Congress (Sept. 9, 2009), available at http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/
speeches/09.09.09.html (recognizing the need to address medical malpractice liability
reform).
38. See Weisman & Adamy, supra note 11 and accompanying text.
39. Obama, supra note 37.
40. Memorandum from the White House to the Secretary of Health & Human Ser-
vices, Demonstration Grants for the Development, Implementation, and Evaluation of Al-
ternatives to the Current Medical Liability System (Sept. 17, 2009), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/Presidentia-Memorandum-Concerning-Medica-Liabiity
-Reform; see also U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., The HHS Patient Safety and
Medical Liability Initiative, HHS.oov, http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2010pres/06/patient-
safetyand medical-liability-initiative.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2011).
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nated administratively and were not linked to the soon to be enacted
PPACA, they do in a number of ways parallel the provisions found in the
PPACA and therefore provide a useful source for analysis, highlighting
both the potential of the PPACA provisions and their limitations. 41
IV. PATIENT SAFETY AND MEDICAL LIABILITY INITIATIVE
DEMONSTRATION FUNDING
The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) and the
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) announced the
first grants to be made under the Patient Safety and Medical Liability
Initiative (PSMLI) on June 11, 2010.42 An amount of $19,652,522 was
divided among seven grant recipients authorized to implement demon-
stration projects, while $3,566,892 was allocated to thirteen planning
projects.43 The four announced goals of this funding are to: (1) "[pjut
patient safety first and work to reduce preventable injuries"; (2) "[f]oster
better communication between doctors and their patients"; (3) "[e]nsure
that patients are compensated in a fair and timely manner for medical
injuries, while also reducing the incidence of frivolous lawsuits"; and (4)
"[r]educe liability premiums. 44
In justifying these goals, the DHHS declared that "[t]oo many patients
experience significant challenges with health care quality and patient
safety, and many injured patients are not well-served by the current med-
ical liability system."' 45 It further cited the following mixture of patient-
focused and physician-focused "background facts" on patient safety and
medical liability: (1) "[a]ccording to the Institute of Medicine (IOM) re-
port To Err Is Human, between 44,000 and 98,000 patients die each year
from medical errors"; (2) "[p]atients who are seriously harmed from med-
ical errors often wait too long for compensation"; (3) "[m]any experts
believe fear of liability is a substantial barrier to the development of
transparent and effective patient safety initiatives in hospitals and other
settings"; (4) "[m]any doctors believe that medical liability concerns lead
to 'defensive medicine,' which in turn may contribute to higher costs"; (5)
"[m]any physicians continue to struggle to pay their medical malpractice
premiums, which vary tremendously by specialty and by state[, as t]he
cost of insurance continues to be one of the highest practice expenses for
some specialties"; and (6) "[flears of medical malpractice claims may lead
to altered practices, restricted emergency coverage, and limited or discon-
tinued high-risk procedures. '46 The DHHS added, "[tihe evidence re-
garding the impact of prior efforts to reduce the occurrence of lawsuits
41. See PPACA § 10607(a), (c).
42. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., HHS Announces Patient
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and improve patient safety is mixed. In particular, evidence regarding the
impact of specific medical liability reforms on health care quality and pa-
tient safety is almost nonexistent; these grants will address that essential
gap."47
As described by the DHHS, "[t]he planning grants give States and
health systems the opportunity to create detailed plans for patient safety
and medical liability reform" and "represent a variety of models that
meet one or more of the patient safety and medical liability reform goals,
including [eleven] that are intended to reduce preventable medical inju-
ries in a variety of ways," while the demonstration projects "support the
implementation and evaluation of evidence-based patient safety and
medical liability projects" and "include a variety of models that meet one
or more of the patient safety and medical liability reform initiative
goals."
4 8
Both state government entities and private health care systems are eli-
gible to apply for funding under the PSMLI. 49 A second round of dem-
onstration project funding was announced in November of 2010, and the
AHRQ is currently accepting proposals for review.50
Of the seven currently funded demonstration projects, three attempt to
address the costs of the medical malpractice liability system directly by
changing what occurs following an adverse medical event but prior to
traditional litigation, while the other four attempt to do so indirectly by
improving the quality of care that patients receive in order to reduce the
number of adverse events and, by extension, the number of lawsuits that
flow from them.51 Since this Article is concerned primarily with how re-
47. Id.
48. Id. (emphasis added).
49. Medical Liability Reform and Patient Safety Demonstration Projects (R18): RFA-
HS-10-021, NAT'L INs-ITUTEs HEALTH, http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/rfa-files/RFA-
HS-10-021.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2011).
50. Medical Liability Reform and Patient Safety Demonstration Projects (R18): PAR-
11-025, NAT'L INSTITUTES HEALTH, http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/pa-files/PAR-11-025.
html (last visited Aug. 17, 2011).
51. See Agency for Healthcare Research & Quality, Medical Liability Reform and Pa-
tient Safety: Demonstration Grants, AHRQ.Gov (June 2010), http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/lia-
bility/demogrants.htm (providing brief summaries of the goals of each of the seven funded
projects, including to: (1) "fill the evidence gap regarding the impact on patient safety and
litigation rates of programs that feature improved communication with patients, trans-
parency, disclosure of adverse events, early offers of compensation, and learning from mis-
takes" (University of Illinois at Chicago); (2) "improve perinatal (the period prior to and
just after birth) patient safety and demonstrate the relationship between improved patient
safety and a reduction in the number of malpractice claims" (Fairview Health Services in
Minneapolis); (3) "use ... a disclosure and compensation model, which informs injured
patients and families promptly and makes efforts to provide prompt compensation" (Uni-
versity of Texas Health Science Center); (4) "establish a uniform, evidence-based obstet-
rics practice model based on the idea that eliminating variation in obstetrics practice will
translate to improved patient safety" (Ascension Health System in St. Louis); (5) establish
"communication training for health care workers and a collaboration between hospitals
and a malpractice insurer to improve adverse event analysis, disclosure, and compensa-
tion" (University of Washington); (6) "protect obstetrical and/or surgery patients from in-
juries caused by providers' mistakes and reduce the cost of medical malpractice through
the use of an expanded and enhanced Judge-Directed Negotiation Program currently used
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forms targeting the litigation process can improve the medical malprac-
tice liability system, the three projects that deal with litigation most
directly deserve a brief mention.
One grant, made to the New York State Unified Court System (princi-
pal investigator, Judy Kluger), funds a program to implement a new early
disclosure and settlement model in five academic medical centers in New
York City and to expand and enhance an existing Judge-Directed Negoti-
ation Program. 52 Another grant, made to the University of Illinois at
Chicago (principal investigator, Timothy McDonald), supports an evalua-
tion of the effectiveness of a comprehensive process for responding to
patient harm events known as the "Seven Pillars" (the long-term objec-
tives of which are "to improve patient safety and mitigate medical liabil-
ity risk through improved communication with patients and families,
disclosure and early offer when patients suffer preventable harm, and by
learning from mistakes to prevent future harms") and to determine the
feasibility of implementing this process at other hospitals in the Chicago
area. 53 The third grant was awarded to the University of Texas Health
Science Center (principal investigator, Eric J. Thomas) to fund a project
studying best practices within a disclosure and compensation system to
determine how best to utilize such systems to promote patient safety and
dispute resolution. 54
Notably, all three of these funded demonstration projects address "dis-
closure and compensation" in one way or another, although none of them
target litigation per se.55 In a nutshell, disclosure and compensation sys-
tems are intended to quickly identify, investigate, and respond to medical
errors when they occur; fully disclose to the patient what the investigating
facility believes occurred; and make an offer of compensation to the pa-
tient for any injuries suffered as a result of medical error.56 Proponents
of such systems identify numerous benefits that might accrue from their
use, including faster dispute resolution, reduced court and attorney costs
for both sides, financial support for injured patients when they need it
most instead of only after years of litigation, and one of the things pa-
in New York's courts, coupled with a new hospital early disclosure and settlement model"
(New York State Unified Court System); and (7) "engage clinicians, patients, malpractice
insurers, and the State public health agency to ensure more timely resolution of medical
errors that occur in outpatient practices and improve communication in all aspects of care"
(Massachusetts State Department of Public Health)).
52. Agency for Healthcare Research & Quality, Grant Number HS19505-01, AHRQ.
Gov, http://gold.ahrq.gov/projectsearch/grant-summary.jsp?grant=R18+HS19505-01 (last
visited Aug. 17, 2011).
53. Agency for Healthcare Research & Quality, Grant Number HS19565-01, AHRQ.
Gov, http://gold.ahrq.gov/projectsearch/grant-summary.jsp?grant=R8+HS19565-01 (last
visited Aug. 17, 2011).
54. Agency for Healthcare Research & Quality, Grant Number HS19561-01, AHRQ.
Goy, http://gold.ahrq.gov/projectsearch/grant summary.jsp?grant=R18+HS19561-01 (last
visited Aug. 17, 2011).
55. See Grant Number HS19505-01, supra note 52; Grant Number HS19561-01, supra
note 54; Grant Number HS19565-01, supra note 53.
56. David A. Hyman, The Poor State of Health Care Quality in the U.S.: Is Malpractice
Liability Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 893, 943 (2005).
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tients want the most: honesty and openness from their health care
providers. 57
While preliminary results from the small set of implemented disclosure
and compensation systems may show some promise, 58 opponents caution
that there is a risk that cost savings will be realized at the expense of
fairness and justice.59 First, because the investigations into whether or
not a patient's injury was due to medical error are carried out by the
institution that would be responsible for compensating them, the institu-
tion may be either consciously or unconsciously biased in favor of finding
that no error occurred. 60 Second, asking patients to accept an offer just a
short time after they have been injured-before they have had a chance
to consult with an attorney, conduct their own investigation, or even re-
cover (physically and emotionally) from their injury-may serve to pres-
sure uninformed patients into accepting inadequate offers.61 Third,
concern has been expressed that this approach may be "extremely puni-
tive toward patients who do not accept the settlement provided. '62
Another frequently cited alternative model to traditional medical mal-
practice litigation is that of "health courts," 63 an approach that is the fo-
cus of the New York grant's Judge-Directed Negotiation Program.64 This
model is driven by the notion that because medicine is a highly special-
ized field, medical malpractice cases should be handled by judges who
have received special training relevant to medicine-related lawsuits so as
to be better able to evaluate the merits of these cases. 65 Judge-Directed
Negotiation goes one step further, having those same judges make con-
certed attempts to bring the parties to the table and then mediate negoti-
ations between them outside of court. 66 As pioneered by Bronx Judge
57. Richard C. Boothman, Amy C. Blackwell, Darrell A. Campbell, Jr., Elaine Com-
miskey & Susan Anderson, A Better Approach to Medical Malpractice Claims? The Univer-
sity of Michigan Experience, 2 J. HEALTH & LIFE Sci. L. 125, 159 (2009); Allen Kachalia,
Samuel R. Kaufman, Richard Boothman, Susan Anderson, Kathleen Welch, Sanjay Saint
& Mary A.M. Rogers, Liability Claims and Costs Before and After Implementation of a
Medical Error Disclosure Program, 153 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 213, 219 (2010).
58. Kachalia et al., supra note 57, at 219.
59. Widman, supra note 22, at 64; Joanne Doroshow, Analysis of HHS Patient Safety
and Medical Liability Initiative Demonstration Grant Proposal for New York State, CENTER
FOR JUSTICE & DEMOCRACY (2010), http://www.centerjd.org/archieves/issues-facts/HH-
SNYMedMalDemoGrantAnalysis.pdf.
60. See Widman, supra note 22, at 63-64.
61. Id. at 64; see also Joanne Doroshow, supra note 59 ("There is little doubt that an
uninformed patient, particularly one who is catastrophically injured, will be pressured by
the hospital to resolve their case for a fraction of what they need or deserve, particularly
when it comes to future medical expenses .... [N]o lay person will ever be capable of
making a reasoned decision as to what they may need, such as in the case of a brain-injured
newborn, without the assistance of counsel or their own expert.").
62. Widman, supra note 22, at 64.
63. Paul Barringer, Health Courts: A Better Approach to Malpractice Reform, 14
BNA's HEALTH L. REP. 877 (2005); Michelle M. Mello, David M. Studdert, Allen B.
Kachalia & Troyen A. Brennan, "Health Courts" and Accountability for Patient Safety, 84
MILBANK Q. 459, 460 (2006); Scott, supra note 22.





Douglas McKeon and the New York City Health and Hospitals Corpora-
tion, Judge-Directed Negotiation has been reported to increase the rate
at which medical malpractice cases settle, decrease the average time it
takes to resolve cases, and reduce the overall cost of those cases.
67
Among the criticisms levied at health courts in general are that "the mod-
est benefits likely to be produced ... are more than matched by the risks
of bias and overreaching that these courts would also present, '68 that
they raise constitutional concerns, 69 that they incorporate an inevitable
slide toward a limitation on awards, 70 and that they do not improve pa-
tient safety.71 With regard to the Judge-Directed Negotiation approach
specifically, concern might be expressed that a judge involved in both the
mediation and subsequent adjudication would be biased by what he or
she learned during mediation, notwithstanding that this information
would not be admissible at the adjudication hearing.72
As might be inferred, these demonstration projects, as well as the thir-
teen funded planning grants,73 are unlikely to bring closure to the debate
on the role and impact of medical malpractice liability and related pro-
posed reforms. This is in part because they do not address medical mal-
practice litigation per se but rather focus on steps that obviate the need
67. Barringer, supra note 63, at 877; Mello et al., supra note 63, at 460; William
Glaberson, To Curb Malpractice Costs, Judges Jump in Early, N.Y. TIMES, June 12,2011, at
Al ("Under a $3 million federal grant, the city courts are now expanding the [judge-di-
rected negotiation] program beyond the Bronx, where it started in cases against city hospi-
tals, to courts in Brooklyn and Manhattan, as well as to cases against private hospitals. It is
to begin in Buffalo courts in the fall [of 2011].").
68. Philip J. Peters, Jr., Health Courts?, 88 B.U. L. REV. 227, 227-28 (2008) (arguing
that health courts should not be introduced without the accompanying implementation of
hospital enterprise liability, which is "the doctrinal change most likely to improve patient
safety").
69, Widman, supra note 22, at 61 ("Health court proponents point to worker's com-
pensation and no-fault auto insurance as models for such a program. However, there is a
significant constitutional difference between those programs and the proposed health
courts: the standard of liability. Those alternatives share a strict liability theory, which
sharply contrasts with the health court model's avoidability theory. The difference is vital
to the constitutionality of such programs because the general maxim is that the legislature
may not remove a right from the jury without offering a quid pro quo. Strict liability is the
quid, and without it, these pilot programs are vulnerable to constitutional attacks at both
the state and federal levels.").
70. Id.
71. Id. at 62.
72. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 408(a)(2).
73. Although space constraints preclude their discussion here, the planning grants
funded under the PSMLI reflect approaches that are similar to those of the demonstration
grants. A description of the planning grants can be found at Agency for Healthcare Re-
search & Quality, Medical Liability Reform and Patient Safety: Planning Grants, AHRQ.
Gov, http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/liability/planninggrants.htm (June 2010) (these planning
grants "represent a variety of models that meet one or more of the patient safety and
medical liability reform goals, including [eleven] that are intended to reduce preventable
medical injuries in a variety of ways," which include "[s]upporting the development of a
'safe harbor' for physicians who can prove they followed State-endorsed evidence-based
care guidelines," "[p]romoting shared decision making," "[s]upporting early disclosure and
offer models, which inform injured patients and families promptly, and make efforts to
provide prompt compensation," and "[p]romoting transparency and enhanced communica-
tion between providers and patients when avoidable injuries occur.").
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for it, and because their results are likely to reflect local efforts and con-
ditions that may not be generalizable to other jurisdictions.74 Further, if
these projects were funded without the aid of the PPACA, the question
remains: what does the PPACA contribute to this ongoing discourse?
V. PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
DEMONSTRATION FUNDING
The answer is, not very much. Like the PSMLI before it, the PPACA
provides for grants to support demonstration projects with the goal of
improving patient safety and reducing the costs of the medical liability
system, but it differs in several critical ways that are likely to impair the
value of this funding.75 First, whereas grants under the PSMLI can be
sought by both states and private health care systems, the PPACA pro-
vides that only states may apply for its grant funding,76 potentially limit-
ing the number of applicants and testing grounds for malpractice reform
ideas. Second, and of particular importance, the requirements that pro-
posals must meet to receive funding are more restrictive under the
PPACA, meaning that many of the leading ideas for malpractice reform
are not eligible for funding.77
Restricting funding only to states is significant in that it automatically
forecloses many otherwise capable applicants from testing ideas for im-
proving patient safety and reforming the way they handle malpractice lia-
bility.78 Notably, only 1,092 out of a total 5,795 hospitals in the United
States are run by state governments, leaving over 80% of these potential
testing grounds for reform unable to independently pursue funding under
the PPACA.79 Two out of the seven currently funded demonstration
grants under the PSMLI were made to private organizations, as were
seven of the thirteen planning grants, none of which would have been
able to directly receive a grant under the PPACA.80 While the states may
solicit input from and involve private health care systems in their demon-
stration projects, 81 states may also channel or limit these contributions
because of political agendas or ideological differences in how they believe
these issues should be approached.
The types of institutions eligible to apply for funding under the
PPACA, however, is not the only restriction that will make it difficult for
the federal money promised by the Act to support serious, effective
74. See generally Medical Liability Reform and Patient Safety: Demonstration Grants,
supra note 51.
75. PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10607(c)(1), 124 Stat. 119-1025 (2010) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
76. Id. § 10607(a).
77. Bovbjerg, supra note 4, at 1.
78. See Medical Liability Reform and Patient Safety: Demonstration Grants, supra note
51 (indicating that seven private institutions received planning grants under the PSMLI).
79. Am. Hosp. Ass'n, Fast Facts on U.S. Hospitals, AHA.ORG, http://www.aha.org/
aha/resource-center/Statistics-and-Studies/fast-facts.html (last updated Dec. 7, 2010).
80. See supra text accompanying notes 43, 51.
81. See PPACA § 106070).
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changes in the medical liability system. Like the PSMLI, the PPACA sets
out a list of criteria that projects must meet to receive funding, but its list
is more extensive and demanding. 82 The requirements for a project to be
eligible for funding under the PPACA are that it:
(A) makes the medical liability system more reliable by increasing
the availability of prompt and fair resolution of disputes;
(B) encourages the efficient resolution of disputes;
(C) encourages the disclosure of health care errors;
(D) enhances patient safety by detecting, analyzing, and helping
to reduce medical errors and adverse events;
(E) improves access to liability insurance;
(F) fully informs patients about the differences in the alternative
and current tort litigation;
(G) provides patients the ability to opt out of or voluntarily with-
draw from participating in the alternative at any time and to pursue
other options, including litigation, outside the alternative;
(H) would not conflict with State law at the time of the applica-
tion in a way that would prohibit the adoption of an alternative to
current tort litigation; and
(I) would not limit or curtail a patient's existing legal rights, abil-
ity to file a claim in or access a State's legal system, or otherwise
abrogate a patient's ability to file a medical malpractice claim. 83
To require one project to satisfy all of these criteria may be unrealistic
and prohibitive. What differentiates the criteria most starkly from the
requirements of the PSMLI, however, are items (H) and (I).84 By
prohibiting any demonstration that would require a change in state law,
the PPACA may not be able to fund studies of options that involve proce-
dures that are not available under existing law. Safe harbor protections,
for example, that would provide predictable liability protection to physi-
cians who adhere to specific evidence-based practices will be unavailable
for testing if such programs would require a change in existing state liabil-
ity rules.85 Similarly, funding would not appear to be available for admin-
istrative compensation systems that would attempt to enhance the
predictability and consistency of awards for injury by making the medical
tort process more like the workers' compensation process because such a
system would inevitably involve substantial changes in patients' rights to
bring traditional medical malpractice lawsuits. 86
82. Id. § 10607(c).
83. Id.
84. Compare PPACA § 10607(c), with Medical Liability Reform and Patient Demon-
stration Projects (R18): RFA-HS-1O-021, supra note 49 (lacking the same restrictions that
are present in the PPACA).
85. Bovbjerg, supra note 4, at 2. It should be noted, however, that reliance on evi-
dence-based guidelines has itself garnered criticism. See Widman, supra note 22, at 65-67.
86. Id. As another example, a "health court" focused project like the Judge-Directed
Negotiation model being studied under an existing PSMLI demonstration grant, see supra
notes 52-54 and accompanying text, would likely require a change in state law to adapt the
existing court structure in many, if not most, jurisdictions and thus be precluded from study
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Further, beyond these limitations on the funding of demonstration
grants, some have argued that because the PPACA does so little to di-
rectly address malpractice and malpractice litigation-related concerns, its
enactment will actually result in an increase in the number of malpractice
cases and related costs as its provisions come into effect.8 7 As more pa-
tient encounters occur per year as a result of more insured people seeking
medical attention, as a matter of course, the total number of adverse
events may increase, resulting in a greater number of medical malpractice
suits. 88 In addition, because the number of available physicians will re-
main constant while the number of patients able to obtain medical care
will increase, this may result in the time and energy of doctors being
stretched to cover more patients, possibly resulting in an increased num-
ber of mistakes on the part of physicians.89 Alternatively, patients may
simply have to wait longer to see a physician, a pattern that has already
been observed for Medicaid patients, 90 but with the result that when pa-
under the PPACA. Similarly, a proposal to study a fiduciary duty approach in lieu of, or as
a supplement to, a more traditional medical malpractice model would not be available in
those states that have not explicitly embraced the fiduciary duty doctrine in this context.
See generally Thomas L. Hafemeister & Sarah P. Bryan, Beware Those Bearing Gifts: Phy-
sicians' Fiduciary Duty to Avoid Pharmaceutical Marketing, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 491 (2009);
Thomas L. Hafemeister & Richard M. Gulbrandsen, Jr., The Fiduciary Obligation of Phy-
sicians to "Just Say No" if an "Informed" Patient Demands Services that Are Not Medically
Indicated, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 335 (2009); Thomas L. Hafemeister & Selina Spinos,
Lean On Me: A Physician's Fiduciary Duty to Disclose an Emergent Medical Risk to the
Patient, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1167 (2009). Even the "early offer" approach, which has
been widely discussed as a possible alternative to the prevailing way in which medical mal-
practice lawsuits are processed, could not be studied because it would involve, among
other things, a change in the burden of proof at trial. See generally Joni Hersch, Jeffrey
O'Connell & W. Kip Viscusi, An Empirical Assessment of Early Offer Reform for Medical
Malpractice, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. S231 (2007); Jeffrey O'Connell, The Large Cost Savings
and Other Advantages of an Early Offer "Crimtorts" Approach to Medical Malpractice
Claims, 17 WIDENER L. J. 835 (2008). For a discussion of prominently noted alternatives to
the existing medical malpractice liability system, most of which would necessitate a change
in state law and thus be ineligible for funding under the PPACA, see generally Anne Un-
derwood, Prescriptions: Experiments in Tort Reform, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2009), http://
prescriptions.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/13/experiments-in-tort-reform/.
87. Rothstein, supra note 3, at 871 ("When fully implemented, PPACA will increase
the number of individuals with health care coverage by approximately 32 million. As a
result, there will be many millions of additional patient encounters each year. If the rate of
adverse events arguably attributable to medical malpractice remains constant, then it might
be assumed that the total number of medical malpractice claims will increase.").
88. Id.
89. Id. Physicians could refuse to see more patients, but it is probably likely that at
least some physicians, driven either by their perceived ethical responsibilities to patients in
need or their desire to maximize their revenue, will significantly increase the number of
patients they see.
90. See Lisa Kim Bach, Medicaid Patients Left Without Care, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Mar.
23, 2008, at 1B, available at http://www.lvrj.com/news/16936926.html; Dan Diamond, New
Year, but Same Old Budget Challenges, CAL. HEALTHLINE, Jan. 12, 2011, http://www.
californiahealthline.org/road-to-reform/2011 / new-year-but-same-old-budget-challenges.
aspx; Kevin Sack, As Medicaid Payments Shrink, Patients Are Abandoned, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 16, 2010, at Al; Kevin Sack & Robert Pear, States Consider Medicaid Cuts as Use
Grows, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2010, at Al; Shawn Tully, Health Care Reform Can't Work
Without More Doctors, CNN MONEY, Apr. 6, 2011, http://money.cnn.com/201l/04/06/news/
doctor shortage-healthcare.fortune/index.htm ("[President Obama's plan] aims to vastly
increase health care coverage while effectively freezing the ranks of the already-busy
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tients are able to see a physician their medical state will have deteriorated
to the point where it is more difficult and complicated to treat, resulting
in more treatment-related adverse events and malpractice litigation.91
VI. CONCLUSION
No doubt the proponents of the PPACA were unwilling to incorporate
medical malpractice litigation reform into the bill lest its divisive nature
destroy the fragile support necessary to enact this legislation, but because
they avoided tackling medical malpractice liability in the debate over the
PPACA, the topic was essentially swept under the rug.92 Although for all
practical purposes they succeeded in keeping medical malpractice reform
out of the bill,93 the underlying fracture associated with this type of litiga-
tion remains. Indeed, this unresolved tension could ultimately undercut
the success of the PPACA, as the Act's attempts to control escalating
health care costs may be undermined if the practice of defensive
medicine, propelled by fears of malpractice liability, continues
unabated.94
The debate about medical malpractice liability will undoubtedly resur-
face,95 though perhaps in a context that the proponents of the PPACA
will find disadvantageous. The PPACA and the PSMLI demonstration
funding criteria and the awarded grants focus on how to dissuade injured
providers needed to furnish all those extra [services] .... Medicare and Medicaid patients
will increasingly face long waits to see a doctor, if they can find a physician to treat them at
all.").
91. Others argue that even if more patients are receiving medical care under the
PPACA (which is a benefit that may well outweigh the cost of any increase in medical
malpractice), other provisions of the Act will have the effect of reducing the total number
of malpractice suits. For example, one reason patients may sue for malpractice is concern
over their ability to pay ongoing medical costs. However, if the PPACA's provisions ex-
pand the availability of insurance, remove lifetime caps on benefits, and eliminate disquali-
fications from coverage based on preexisting conditions, far more injured patients will be
able to rely on insurance to cover their medical costs instead of awards won through the
unpredictable course of litigation, and thus they will not feel pressure to sue because of a
fear that needed insurance benefits will not be available to them. Rothstein, supra note 3,
at 871.
92. See generally PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6801,124 Stat. 119-1025 (2010) (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
93. Id.
94. See Mello et al., supra note 16, at 1574 (recognizing the extensive cost of defensive
medicine).
95. Indeed, if anything, this debate has continued unchecked. See Emily Ramshaw,
State's Tort Reform Makes Lawyers Wary of Taking on Patients, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2010,
at A39A; see also Walt Bogdanich & Kristina Rebelo, A Pinpoint Beam Strays Invisibly,
Harming Instead of Healing, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2010, at Al; Amy Goldstein, GOP
Lacks Clear Health Plan, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 2011, at A03; Loser Pays, Everyone Wins:
Texas Pushes the British Rule on Tort Reform, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 2010, at A20; Press
Release, 24-7PressRelease, "SAFE HARBOR" FOR DOCTORS, CAPS, HEALTH COURTS AND
OTHER PANACEAS ARE NOT THE ANSWER TO RISING HEALTH CARE COSTS (JAN. 18,
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patients from pursuing medical malpractice claims in court. 96 These ef-
forts may in turn provide support and momentum for calls that an avoid-
ance of the legal system should be the emphasis of future medical
malpractice liability reform. Indeed, avoiding litigation is a high priority
for members of the medical profession because litigation tends to be un-
pleasant and distracting, it may cause them to pay increased medical mal-
practice premiums, and it can stigmatize and jeopardize a physician's
reputation and status.97
These funding criteria and grants, however, do virtually nothing to ad-
dress what happens when disclosure and compensation systems fail, 98
which they will almost inevitably do in some cases when the parties can
not agree on a resolution. Also, in these relatively informal discussions,
patients may be at risk of not fully understanding their situation and op-
tions, or they may be unable to effectively advocate on their own behalf.
Further, these largely private negotiations, unlike the public forum of liti-
gation, may fail to reduce the likelihood of future patient harm. By em-
phasizing the deleterious impact of medical malpractice litigation on
physicians,99 the funding criteria and resulting demonstration projects of
the PPACA and the PSMLI generally fail to ensure that patients who
have been harmed by medical malpractice, through no fault of their own,
will be adequately compensated and that future medical malpractice will
be deterred.
Finally, by directing that demonstration grants be awarded based on
restrictive criteria1 00 that prevent funding from being devoted to propos-
als that would explore more substantial, creative alternatives to the status
quo, the more difficult and potentially troubling questions related to
medical malpractice liability reform tend to be avoided and alternative
solutions remain untested. The focus adopted by the PPACA and the
PSMLI will instead promote the likelihood that avoiding litigation will be
96. See Medical Liability Reform and Patient Safety: Demonstration Grants, supra note
51 (emphasizing that the seven awarded demonstration grants meet the initiative's goal of
"[p]romoting early disclosures and settlement, through a court-directed alternative dispute
resolution model"); Medical Liability Reform and Patient Safety Demonstration Projects
(R18): RFA-HS-1O-021, supra note 49 (stressing that one of the purposes of the funding is
to reduce "the incidence of frivolous lawsuits and liability premiums").
97. See Roberts, supra note 25, at 47 (noting the problem of increasing medical mal-
practice premiums); see also Anupam B. Jena, Seth Seabury, Darius Lakdawalla &
Amitabh Chandra, Malpractice Risk According to Physician Specialty, 365 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 629, 634-35 (2011) ("[P]hysicians consistently report concern over malpractice and
the intense pressure to practice defensive medicine .... Physicians can insure against
indemnity payments through malpractice insurance, but they cannot insure against the in-
direct costs of litigation, such as time, stress, added work, and reputational damage.").
98. See generally Medical Liability Reform and Patient Safety: Demonstration Grants,
supra note 51 (showing the awarded grants' failure to address situations when disclosure
and compensation systems fail).
99. See PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10607(c), 124 Stat. 119-1025 (2010) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Medical Liability Reform and Patent Safety
Demonstration Projects (R18): RFA-HS-1O-021, supra note 49.
100. PPACA § 10607(c)(2).
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the center of future medical malpractice liability reform debate, or it will
at least enhance the likelihood that the opposing sides in this debate will
continue to largely talk past one another.10 1
101. As evidence that these two sides can find common ground, see Amy Jeter, Deal
Would Raise Caps on Malpractice Suits in Va., THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Jan. 11, 2011, http://
hamptonroads.com/2011/01/deal-would-raise-cap-malpractice-suits-va; Anita Kumar, Bill
Would Raise Medical Malpractice Awards in Va., VA. POLITIcs, Dec. 3, 2010, http://voices.
washingtonpost.comlvirginiapolitics/2010/12/post_711.html.
[Vol. 64
Casenotes
0 ItAS.
